Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Medical device. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Medical device. Mostrar todas las entradas

15 febrero, 2012

Postmarketing Surveillance of Medical Devices — Filling in the Gaps

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Frederic S. Resnic, M.D., and Sharon-Lise T. Normand, Ph.D.

February 14, 2012 (10.1056/NEJMp1114865)

Failures of implantable medical devices, although rare, can carry a substantial risk of serious injury. From 2000 through 2011, more than 150 new high-risk medical devices were approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) through the premarket approval (known as PMA) process, and an additional 600 devices were cleared through the less demanding 510(k) process, in four medical specialty areas (cardiovascular care, neurology, obstetrics and gynecology, and orthopedics; seegraphNumbers of High-Risk (Class III) Medical Devices Approved or Cleared by the FDA in Cardiovascular Care, Neurology, Obstetrics and Gynecology, and Orthopedics, 2000–2011.). The problem that Hauser describes (10.1056/NEJMp1114695) — the erosion of the insulation in St. Jude Medical's Riata leads for implantable cardioverter–defibrillators — highlights the fact that medical devices are complex assemblies of multiple components, and the failure of any single component can lead to unexpected and serious safety problems. Because it is impossible to design an implantable medical device with zero risk of failure, effective systems for monitoring safety after a device is on the market are essential for protecting the public health. Moreover, since incremental changes are made in medical devices throughout their life cycles, it is impractical to prospectively study each change comprehensively before marketing. Balancing the need for robust postmarketing safety monitoring with the need to avoid the stifling of innovation is a prime responsibility of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) at the FDA.
The FDA's safety-surveillance strategy has relied on physicians, health care institutions, manufacturers, and patients to report medical device failures and complications through the Medical Device Reporting system. This system can identify unanticipated medical device failures and complications but requires extensive analytic review and has important limitations.1 Although the CDRH receives more than 100,000 reports annually, the proportion of medical device failures that are registered is estimated to be less than 0.5%; this low reporting rate greatly limits the information available regarding the balance of risk and health improvement associated with a given medical device.2
Several FDA initiatives have been launched to fill the gaps in the passive event-reporting system. In 2002, the CDRH established the Medical Product Safety Network, which represents more than 300 health care institutions that collaborate to identify and investigate trends in device failures and adverse events. In 2007, the FDA was given the regulatory authority to mandate follow-up safety studies after initial market approval (the Section 522 rule) — a change that improves the agency's flexibility to investigate potential safety concerns. In 2009, the FDA launched the Sentinel initiative, a program to integrate the electronic health records of large, representative U.S. populations for postmarketing safety analysis. However, despite great success in linking nearly 100 million claims-based health records, Sentinel projects have thus far focused only on medications — at least in part because of the very limited information about medical devices currently available in billing claims data.
In contrast to drugs, medical devices suffer from a major impediment to safety monitoring: the lack of unique device identifiers (UDIs). To address this limitation, the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 authorized the agency to develop a comprehensive UDI system, which is currently under review within the Office of Management and Budget. As a UDI system is integrated with administrative and claims databases, it will become possible to identify patients who have been exposed to specific devices. However, the complex interplay among device design, the procedural safety of implantation, the learning curve associated with medical devices, and the risks to individual patients will continue to make it difficult to conduct effective and reliable safety surveillance using only billing data.
There are important opportunities to leverage large, disease-specific clinical registries for monitoring device safety. In many countries, such registries are a mandatory component of the health care system and required for all implantations of high-risk devices. In the United States, there is no national system to ensure that registries exist for high-risk medical devices. Nevertheless, several nonprofit professional medical organizations in the United States have recognized the critical need for medical device registries and have spearheaded their development in an effort to monitor and improve the quality of care. The American College of Cardiology, in conjunction with several partner organizations, has established detailed clinical registries covering many high-risk cardiovascular devices, including coronary stents, implantable defibrillators, and defibrillator leads, which together contain information on approximately 4 million implantation procedures. The recently developed transcatheter heart-valve registry will provide early postmarketing information about the safety of this revolutionary treatment for patients with high-risk aortic-valve stenosis. Clinical registries in cardiac surgery already exist, and newer efforts by professional societies related to orthopedics, ophthalmology, and other fields are under way.
Perhaps the most successful example of a coordinated effort to study newly introduced devices has been the Interagency Registry for Mechanically Assisted Circulatory Support (INTERMACS), established to capture detailed clinical data on all patients receiving implantable ventricular assist pumps in the United States. Its success is related to the requirement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) that patient information be entered into an audited national registry as a condition of reimbursement. INTERMACS now serves as a ready infrastructure to support the postapproval study of every new generation of mechanical cardiac support device, saving manufacturers substantial time and resources that they would otherwise have to invest in establishing new systems of data collection, auditing, and analysis.3
Creating and maintaining these detailed clinical registries is challenging and expensive. Many registries are supported by voluntary submissions from health care providers, so hospitals must bear the costs of collecting and submitting information. Emerging standards for electronic health records, including “meaningful use” regulations, will provide unprecedented opportunities for securely mapping clinical information to distributed clinical registries.
But having reliable and complete clinical data is not enough. The development of sound methods and practical tools for monitoring safety over a product's life cycle is essential. We have advocated a strategy of automated prospective surveillance of high-risk implantable devices, using database monitoring tools to support continuous surveillance of clinical registries.4 Such tools are capable of monitoring hundreds of high-risk medical devices simultaneously, to maximize efficiency in detecting unrecognized safety problems. Automated surveillance systems constantly watch a growing database of clinical experience and trigger an alert when the rate of a device failure or complication rises above threshold levels. Automated monitoring tools must incorporate the best available statistical methods to account for the complexity of the surveillance of device safety, including risk differences among patients, effects of physicians' learning curves, and interactions between the device and medications; they must also balance specificity and sensitivity in the detection of safety signals to permit efficient epidemiologic exploration of such alerts.
The complexity of device-safety surveillance requires the use of complementary approaches in an organized, prospective strategy. A comprehensive national safety surveillance system must include several key elements, beginning with the adoption of the proposed UDI system. We recommend expedited review and finalization of the UDI rule to permit implementation as soon as possible. Next, the FDA, together with the CMS, should require that detailed information regarding the use of high-risk devices and clinical outcomes be submitted to selected national registries operated by independent academic or professional medical organizations. We recommend that the FDA retain full rights of access to the data for additional analysis as needed. Third, the FDA should redirect a portion of the resources currently spent by the medical device industry on underpowered condition-of-approval studies to support the national device-safety registries. Fourth, automated safety-surveillance tools should be applied to device registries to prospectively monitor for the most severe and the most common device failures and complications. Finally, methods for linking information across premarketing studies, the new registries, and existing FDA surveillance systems to provide valid safety estimates require further development.
Complementing existing event-reporting systems with enhanced prospective surveillance of high-quality registries will permit the FDA to efficiently monitor the safety of increasingly complex and widely used medical devices.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
This article (10.1056/NEJMp1114865) was published on February 14, 2012, at NEJM.org.

SOURCE INFORMATION

From the Cardiovascular Division, Brigham and Women's Hospital (F.S.R.); the Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School (S.-L.T.N.); and the Department of Biostatistics, Harvard School of Public Health (S.-L.T.N.) — all in Boston.

19 octubre, 2011

Medical Device Innovation — Is “Better” Good Enough?

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Source: NEJM
Last year, the United States spent $95 billion on medical devices, nearly half of the $200 billion spent on devices worldwide.1 Our investment in devices has yielded impressive gains in length and quality of life from products such as implantable cardioverter–defibrillators, pacemakers, and artificial joints (cardiovascular and orthopedic devices account for more than 35% of the market1). Roughly 10 million Americans have symptomatic knee osteoarthritis,2 a leading cause of disability and the most common indication for total knee arthroplasty. More than 600,000 total knee arthroplasty procedures are performed annually in the United States; 85% of recipients report functional improvement, and the annual failure rate is 0.5 to 1.6%.3 Inspired by these successes, medical device innovation continues. Each year for the past decade, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved more than 35 new systems or components for total knee arthroplasty. Most are designed to improve durability, and their manufacturers cite laboratory studies showing reductions in wear. Advertising campaigns promote innovative implants for younger, more physically active patients, expanding the market for knee arthroplasty.
But oversight of device innovation is currently under scrutiny. Safety concerns have been raised over total joint components and other devices approved through the FDA's 510(k) clearance process, whereby devices perceived as posing a low risk of complications are approved for marketing without clinical trials. These concerns led the Institute of Medicine to recommend eliminating the 510(k) process, calling it ineffective and unsalvageable.4 The current oversight system has been simultaneously faulted for inadequate assurance of safety and efficacy and for suppressing innovation. Since regulatory approval hinges on claims of similarity to previously approved devices, the process may encourage the development of devices that provide only small improvements at higher cost than their predecessors. The trade-offs between incremental improvement and the additional costs and technical complexity of the required procedure are poorly understood and seldom investigated rigorously.
When adequately powered randomized trials are not feasible, a model-based approach can offer insight into the interplay among device efficacy and durability, patient characteristics, costs, and long-term outcomes. We used a validated “state-transition” computer-simulation model of the natural history and management of knee osteoarthritis5 to forecast clinical outcomes associated with hypothetical “innovative” total knee implants as compared with existing implants. We considered cohorts of persons with end-stage, symptomatic knee osteoarthritis, stratified by age and presence of coexisting conditions at the time of arthroplasty. We used a range of values for the potential reduction in the likelihood of long-term implant failure with hypothetical innovative implants and estimated the proportion of each patient cohort that would remain alive with their original (standard or innovative) implant intact 20 years after surgery. We examined the effects of increasing the risk of short-term failure while simultaneously decreasing the rate of long-term failure, as might be expected from a device offering improved survival at the expense of greater technical complexity. (Details are presented in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.)
According to our model, by 20 years after a standard total knee arthroplasty, 19% of people who were healthy and 50 to 59 years of age at the time of the surgery and 86% of those who were 70 to 79 years of age and had coexisting conditions would have died; 65% and 11% of these groups, respectively, would be alive with their original implant intact. In part because of the much higher risk of death among older patients, the cumulative risk of requiring revision surgery within 20 years after a primary total knee arthroplasty would be twice as high among younger, healthier patients than among older patients with coexisting conditions (18% vs. 9%; see graph
Cumulative Risk of Revision Surgery 20 Years after Total Knee Arthroplasty with a Standard Implant and with an Innovative Implant, According to Computer-Simulation Modeling.
). Innovative implants with long-term failure rates 70% lower than those of current implants (an improvement similar to those that some manufacturers have demonstrated in the laboratory) would reduce the cumulative risk of revision by 11% among healthy 50-to-59-year-olds and 6% among 70-to-79-year-olds with coexisting conditions. If short-term failure rates quintupled (as recent data on innovative orthopedic devices suggest they could), the reductions in cumulative risk of revision would be lessened by 35% among healthy 50-to-59-year-olds and 59% among 70-to-79-year-olds with coexisting conditions, potentially offsetting the benefits of decreases in long-term failure.
Our findings suggest that there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to the use of innovative devices. In the case of total knee arthroplasty, a patient's life expectancy has a marked effect on his or her anticipated benefit from improvements in durability over existing implants, whose survival rates are already excellent. Given the low annual failure rate of existing implants, even significant reductions in long-term failure rates would have little effect on overall implant survival in older, sicker patients. This finding is even more significant when innovative implants have greater short-term failure rates (possibly attributable to the learning curve associated with new technology). There are also additional trade-offs that should be considered in evaluating and pricing innovative devices. For example, innovations are typically accompanied by cost increases, and devices providing small, incremental clinical benefits may be less likely to offer good value for any additional investment.
We believe that our approach and the insights it can offer extend well beyond knee implants. Total knee implants are similar to many medical devices — such as hip and spinal implants, other orthopedic hardware, and ophthalmologic implants — in that they improve quality of life rather than survival. Thus, our work has implications for the development and adoption of any medical device offering improved long-term clinical benefit at increased initial cost. These analyses demonstrate that even small decreases in long-term device failure can provide clinical value, but these innovations are unlikely to provide equal benefit to all patients. Innovative technologies may also increase the risk of short-term complications, owing to increased complexity of the procedure or the greater technical skill required to optimally implement such advances — a phenomenon that is rarely captured in laboratory-based testing. Furthermore, these technologies typically cost more than their predecessors. These considerations may further restrict the populations in which an innovative device offers good value.
Our goal is not to set limits on who receives which implants, but to illustrate a model-based approach to improving new-device evaluation. Decisions about the marketing, use, and pricing of medical devices are often made in the absence of robust outcomes data. As the current controversy over the 510(k) process attests, traditional approaches to clinical investigation and evaluation are poorly suited to exploring and balancing the competing considerations at play — for instance, estimating likely improvements in long-term efficacy and device durability, factoring in the competing risks when devices are used in older or higher-risk patients, and determining our willingness to pay for incremental improvements. A model-based assessment can help to define the circumstances under which the diffusion of medical device innovations to ever-expanding patient populations is clinically and economically justified.
Model-based evaluations could help define the thresholds for complication and efficacy rates and costs that would be required to improve on existing device performance while maintaining acceptable economic value. This information could then inform postmarketing surveillance efforts, triggering reviews at prespecified efficacy or complication thresholds and facilitating rapid application of new data as they become available. Manufacturers could use such data to improve device development; researchers could identify target populations for evaluating novel technologies; insurers could identify opportunities for value-based reimbursement; and consumers could be educated about what clinical benefits they are getting for their money. The complex trade-offs between short- and long-term health and economic consequences of technological innovation may not be captured by even the most sophisticated randomized trials. Model-based approaches may provide invaluable insights for evaluating medical device innovation and merit consideration as a standard component of the evaluation process.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
SOURCE INFORMATION
From Yale School of Medicine (L.G.S.) and Yale School of Public Health (A.D.P.) — both in New Haven, CT; the Veterans Affairs Connecticut Healthcare System, West Haven, CT (L.G.S.); and Brigham and Women's Hospital (B.N.R., D.H.S., I.G., H.G., J.N.K., E.L.), Harvard Medical School (D.H.S., E.L.), Harvard School of Public Health (J.N.K.), and Boston University School of Public Health (E.L.) — all in Boston.